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their relation to each other is provided.  
 
Keywords: capital structure, market timing, trade-off theory, leverage, debt, equity, agency costs 
 
JEL clasification: G32: Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure 
 
1. Introduction 
Since  the  publication  of  the  Modigliani  and  Miller’s  (1958)  “irrelevance  theory  of  capital 
structure”,  the  theory  of  corporate  capital  structure  has  been  a  study  of  interest  to  finance 
economists.  
Over  the  years  three    major  theories  of  capital  structure  emerged  which  diverge  from  the 
assumption of perfect capital markets under which the “irrelevance model” is working. The first 
is the trade-off theory which assumes that firms trade off the benefits and costs of debt and equity 
financing and find an “optimal” capital structure after accounting for market imperfections such 
as taxes, bankruptcy costs and agency costs. The second is the pecking order theory (Myers, 
1984, Myers and Majluf, 1984) that argues that firms follow a financing hierarchy to minimize 
the problem of information asymmetry between the firm’s managers-insiders and the outsiders-
shareholders.   
Recently,  Baker  and  Wurgler  (2002)  have  suggested  a  new  theory  of  capital  structure:  the 
“market timing theory of capital structure”. This theory states that the current capital structure is 
the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. Market timing implies that 
firms issue new shares when they perceive they are overvalued and that firms repurchase own 
shares when they consider these to be undervalued. Market timing issuing behaviour has been 
well established empirically by others already, but Baker and Wurgler show that the influence of 
market timing on capital structure is highly persistent. 
 
2. The Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
The theory of business finance in a modern sense starts with the Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
capital structure irrelevance proposition. Before them, there was no generally accepted theory of 
capital structure. Modigliani and Miller start by assuming that the firm has a particular set of 
expected cash flows. When the firm chooses a certain proportion of debt and equity to finance its 
assets, all that it does is to divide up the cash flows among investors. Investors and firms are 
assumed to have equal access to financial markets, which allows for homemade leverage. The 
investor can create any leverage that was wanted but not offered, or the investor can get rid of 
any leverage that the firm took on but was not wanted. As a result, the leverage of the firm has no 
effect on the market value of the firm. 
Their  paper led  subsequently  to  both  clarity  and  controversy.  As  a  matter  of  theory,  capital 
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different  types  of  capital  structure  irrelevance  propositions.  The  classic  arbitrage-based 
irrelevance propositions provide settings in which arbitrage by investors keeps the value of the 
firm  independent  of  its  leverage.  In  addition  to  the  original  Modigliani  and  Miller  paper, 
important contributions include papers by  Hirshleifer (1966) and Stiglitz (1969). The second 
irrelevance proposition  concludes that “given a firm’s investment policy, the dividend payout it 
chooses to follow will affect neither the current price of its shares nor the total return to its 
shareholders” (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). In other words, in perfect markets, neither capital 
structure choices nor dividend policy decisions matter. 
The 1958 paper stimulated serious research devoted to disproving irrelevance as a matter of 
theory or as an empirical matter. This research has shown that the Modigliani-Miller theorem 
fails under a variety of circumstances. The most commonly used elements include consideration 
of  taxes,  transaction  costs,  bankruptcy  costs,  agency  conflicts,  adverse  selection,  lack  of 
separability between financing and operations, time-varying financial market opportunities, and 
investor clientele effects. Alternative models use differing elements from this list. Given that so 
many different ingredients are available, it is not surprising that many different theories have 
been proposed. Covering all of these would go well beyond the scope of this paper. Harris and 
Raviv (1991) provided a survey of the development of this theory as of 1991. 
As an empirical proposition, the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition is not easy to test. 
With debt and firm value both plausibly endogenous and driven by other factors such as profits, 
collateral,  and  growth  opportunities,  we  cannot  establish  a  structural  test  of  the  theory  by 
regressing value on debt
207. But the fact that fairly reliable empirical relations between a number 
of factors and corporate leverage exist, while not disproving the theory, does make it seem an 
unlikely characterization of how real businesses are financed. 
A popular defense has been to argue as follows: “While the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not 
provide a  realistic  description  of how  firms  finance  their operations,  it  provides  a  means  of 
finding reasons why financing may matter.” This description provides a reasonable interpretation 
of much of the theory of corporate finance. Accordingly, it influenced the early development of 
both the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. 
 
3. The Trade-Off Theory 
The term trade-off theory is used by different authors to describe a family of related theories. In 
all of these theories, a decision maker running a firm evaluates the various costs and benefits of 
alternative  leverage  plans.  Often  it  is  assumed  that  an  interior  solution  is  obtained  so  that 
marginal costs and marginal benefits are balanced. 
The original version of the trade-off theory grew out of the debate over the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem. When corporate income tax was added to the original irrelevance, this created a benefit 
for debt in that it served to shield earnings from taxes. Since the firm's objective function is 
linear, and there is no offsetting cost of debt, this implied 100% debt financing. 
Several aspects of Myers' definition of the trade-off merit discussion. First, the target is not 
directly observable. It may be imputed from evidence, but that depends on adding a structure. 
Different papers add that structure in different ways. 
Second, the tax code is much more complex than that assumed by the theory. Depending on 
which features of the tax code are included, different conclusions regarding the target can be 
reached. Graham (2003) provides a useful review of the literature on the tax effects. 
Third, bankruptcy costs must be deadweight costs rather than transfers from one claimant to 
another. The nature of these costs is important too. Haugen and Senbet (1978) provide a useful 
discussion of bankruptcy costs. 
                                                       
207 Fama and French (1998) and Kemsley and Nissim (2002) provide related discussions. 317 
 
Fourth, transaction costs must take a specific form for the analysis to work. For the adjustment to 
be gradual rather than abrupt, the marginal cost of adjusting must increase when the adjustment 
is  larger.  Leary  and  Roberts  (2005)  describe  the  implications  of  alternative  adjustment  cost 
assumptions. 
 
Static trade-off theory 
The  static  trade-off  theory  affirms  that  firms  have  optimal  capital  structures,  which  they 
determine by trading off the costs against the benefits of the use of debt and equity. One of the 
benefits of the use of debt is the advantage of a debt tax shield. One of the disadvantages of debt 
is the  cost  of potential  financial distress,  especially  when  the  firm  relies  on too  much  debt. 
Already, this leads to a trade-off between the tax benefit and the disadvantage of higher risk of 
financial distress. But there are more cost and benefits involved with the use of debt and equity. 
One other major cost factor consists of agency costs. Agency costs stem from conflicts of interest 
between the different stakeholders of the firm and because of ex post asymmetric information 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986)). Hence, incorporating agency costs into the 
static trade-off theory means that a firm determines its capital structure by trading off the tax 
advantage of debt against the costs of financial distress of too much debt and the agency costs of 
debt against the agency cost of equity. Many other cost factors have been suggested under the 
trade-off theory, and it would lead to far to discuss them all. Therefore, this discussion ends with 
the assertion that an important prediction of the static trade-off theory is that firms target their 
capital structures, i.e. if the actual leverage ratio deviates from the optimal one, the firm will 
adapt its financing behaviour in a way that brings the leverage ratio back to the optimal level. 
 
The Dynamic Trade-off Theory 
Constructing models that recognize the role of time requires specifying a number of aspects that 
are  typically  ignored  in  a  single-period  model.  Of  particular  importance  are  the  roles  of 
expectations and adjustment costs. In a dynamic model, the correct financing decision typically 
depends on the financing margin that the firm anticipates in the next period. Some firms expect to 
pay out funds in the next period, while others expect to raise funds. If funds are to be raised, they 
may take the form of debt or equity. More generally, a firm undertakes a combination of these 
actions.  
An important precursor to modern dynamic trade-off theories was Stiglitz (1973), who examines 
the effects of taxation from a public finance perspective. Stiglitz's model is not a trade-off theory 
since he took the drastic step of assuming away uncertainty. 
The first dynamic models to consider the tax savings versus bankruptcy cost trade-off are Kane et 
al.  (1984)  and  Brennan  and  Schwartz  (1984).  Both  analyzed  continuous  time  models  with 
uncertainty, taxes, and bankruptcy costs, but no transaction costs. Since firms react to adverse 
shocks  immediately  by  rebalancing  costlessly,  firms  maintain  high  levels  of  debt  to  take 
advantage of the tax savings. 
Dynamic trade-off models can also be used to consider the option values embedded in deferring 
leverage  decisions  to  the  next  period.  Goldstein  et  al.  (2001)  observe  that  a  firm  with  low 
leverage  today  has  the  subsequent  option  to  increase  leverage.  Under  their  assumptions,  the 
option to increase leverage in the future serves to reduce the otherwise optimal level of leverage 
today. Strebulaev (2007) analyzed a model quite similar to that of Fischer et al. (1989) and 
Goldstein et al. (2001). Again, if firms optimally finance only periodically because of transaction 
costs, then the debt ratios of most firms will deviate from the optimum most of the time. In the 
model, the firm's leverage responds less to short-run equity fluctuations and more to long-run 
value changes. 
Certain ideas are fairly general in dynamic models. The optimal financial choice today depends 
on what is expected to be optimal in the next period. In the next period, it may be optimal to raise 318 
 
funds or to pay them out. If raising new funds, it might be optimal to raise them in the form of 
debt or in the form of equity. In each case, what is expected to be optimal in the next period will 
help to pin down the relevant comparison for the firm in the current period. 
Much of the work on dynamic trade-off models is fairly recent and so any judgements on their 
results  must  be  somewhat  tentative.  This  work  has  already  fundamentally  altered  our 
understanding  of  mean  reversion, the  role  of  profits,  the role  of  retained  earnings,  and  path 
dependence. As a result, the trade-off class of models now appears to be much more promising 
than it did even just a few years ago. 
 
4. The Pecking Order Theory 
The pecking order theory does not take an optimal capital structure as a starting point, but instead 
asserts the empirical fact
208 that firms show a distinct preference for using internal finance (as 
retained earnings or excess liquid assets) over external finance. If internal funds are not enough to 
finance investment opportunities, firms may or may not acquire external financing, and if they 
do, they will choose among the different external finance sources in such a way as to minimise 
additional  costs  of  asymmetric  information.  The  latter  costs  basically  reflect  the  “lemon 
premium”(Akerlof, 1970) that outside investors ask for the risk of failure for the average firm in 
the market. The resulting pecking order of financing is as follows: internally generated funds 
first, followed by respectively low-risk debt financing and share financing. 
In Myers and Majluf model (1984), outside investors rationally discount the firm's stock price 
when managers issue equity instead of riskless debt. To avoid this discount, managers avoid 
equity whenever possible. The Myers and Majluf model predicts that managers will follow a 
pecking order, using up internal funds first, then using up risky debt, and finally resorting to 
equity. In the absence of investment opportunities, firms retain profits and build up financial 
slack to avoid having to raise external finance in the future. 
The  pecking  order  theory  regards  the  market-to-book  ratio  as  a  measure  of  investment 
opportunities. With this interpretation in mind, both Myers (1984) and Fama and French (2000) 
note that a contemporaneous relationship between the market-to-book ratio and capital structure 
is difficult to reconcile with the static pecking order model. Iteration of the static version also 
suggests that periods of high investment opportunities will tend to push leverage higher toward a 
debt capacity. To the extent that high past market-to-book actually coincides with high past 
investment, however, results suggest that such periods tend to push leverage lower
209. 
Empirical evidence supports both the pecking order and the trade-off theory. Empirical tests to 
see whether the pecking order or the trade-off theory is a better predictor of observed capital 
structures find support for both theories of capital structure (Shyam -Sunder and Myers, 1999; 
Fama and French, 2002).   
 
5. The Market timing theory 
The market timing theory of capital structure argues that firms time their equity issues in the 
sense that they issue new stock when the stock price is perceived to be overvalued, and buy back 
own shares when there is undervaluation. Consequently, fluctuations in stock prices affect firms 
capital structures. There are two versions of equity market timing that lead to similar capital 
structure dynamics. 
The first assumes economic agents to be rational. Companies are assumed to issue equity directly 
after a positive information release which reduces the asymmetry problem between the firm’s 
                                                       
208 The pecking order theory was first introduced by Donaldson (1961), in a survey study among american firms. 
209 Helwege and Liang (1996) find that the probability of raising external finance is unrelated to the internal funds 
deficit, and that firms that could have obtained bank loans often choose to issue equity instead. This also contrasts with 
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management  and  stockholders.  The  decrease  in  information  asymmetry  coincides  with  an 
increase in the stock price. In response, firms create their own timing opportunities.  
The second theory assumes the economic agents to be irrational (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Due 
to irrational behaviour there is a time-varying mispricing of the stock of the company. Managers 
issue  equity  when  they  believe  its  cost  is  irrationally  low  and  repurchase  equity  when  they 
believe its cost is irrationally high. It is important to know that the second version of market 
timing  does  not  require  that  the  market  actually  be  inefficient.  It  does  not  ask  managers  to 
successfully predict stock returns. The assumption is simply that managers believe that they can 
time the market. In a study by Graham and Harvey (2001), managers admited trying to time the 
equity market, and most of those that have considered issuing common stock report that "the 
amount by which our stock is undervalued or over- valued" was an important consideration. 
This study supports the assumption in the market timing theory mentioned above which is that 
managers believe they can time the market, but does not immediately distinguish between the 
mispricing and the dynamic asymmetric information version of market timing. 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) provide evidence that equity market timing has a persistent effect on 
the capital structure of the firm. They define a market timing measure, which is a weighted 
average of external capital needs over the past few years, where the weights used are market to 
book values of the firm. They find that leverage changes are strongly and positively related to 
their  market  timing  measure,  so  they  conclude  that  the  capital  structure  of  a  firm  is  the 
cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. 
 
4. Conclusions 
When regarding to a firm’s capital structure, the Modigliani-Miller theorem opened a literature 
on the fundamental nature of debt versus equity. The capital structure of a firm is the result of the 
transactions with various suppliers of finance. In the perfect capital markets world of Modigliani 
and Miller, the costs of different forms of financing do not vary independently and therefore there 
is no extra gain from opportunistically choosing among them.  Nevertheless, financing clearly 
matters, and that as a consequence of taxes, differences in information and agency costs. The 
various theories of capital structure differ in their interpretation of these factors. Each emphasizes 
some cost and benefits of alternative financing strategies, so they are not designed to be general. 
According to the standard trade-off theory, taxes and bankruptcy account for the corporate use of 
debt.  According  to  the  standard  pecking  order  theory,  adverse  selection  accounts  for  the 
corporate use of debt. Both theories having weak parts, it is not surprising that there is active 
research on this matter. In the market timing theory, there is no optimal capital structure, so 
market timing decisions accumulate over time into the capital structure outcome. From this point 
of view, the market timing theory appears to have the most explanatory interest. 
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